

# CIÊNCIAS SOCIALMENTE APLICÁVEIS:

INTEGRANDO SABERES E  
ABRINDO CAMINHOS

JORGE JOSÉ MARTINS RODRIGUES  
MARIA AMÉLIA MARQUES

(Organizadores)

VOL IV



EDITORA  
ARTEMIS

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## APRESENTAÇÃO

O livro que ora se encontra nas vossas mãos, no seu quarto volume, é por tradição um livro de temática interdisciplinar e transdisciplinar no campo das ciências sociais aplicadas. É interdisciplinar porque cruza várias disciplinas do saber. A sua transdisciplinaridade fica a dever-se aos múltiplos campos do conhecimento abrangidos, com os trabalhos apresentados a inserirem-se em temáticas emergentes nos vários campos científicos.

A metodologia seguida na organização deste volume, podendo ser discutível, privilegiou os conteúdos dos artigos, o que originou um macro título Sociedade-Cidadão-Ambiente, abrangendo os eixos temáticos: Sociedade, cultura e turismo, Cidadania, saúde e bem-estar, Recursos energéticos e sustentabilidade ambiental. Na construção da estrutura de cada um destes eixos procurou-se seguir uma lógica em que cada artigo possa contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do artigo seguinte, gerando-se um fluxo de conhecimento acumulado que se pretende fluido e em espiral crescente.

Assim, o eixo Sociedade, cultura e turismo é constituído por oito artigos que revelam preocupações holísticas com o planeta Terra. A interdependência financeira das economias desenvolvidas mostra como as liberdades individuais, fruto de redes de relações nem sempre perceptíveis, as quais hipotecam os recursos da sociedade, se nada for feito, podem ter efeitos devastadores nas comunidades locais. Contudo, se o desenvolvimento económico for enquadrado por um planeamento estratégico que congregue os interesses e expectativas dos diferentes *stakeholders*, toda a comunidade poderá sair a ganhar. O desenvolvimento e crescimento turístico com base nos costumes e tradições locais, pode contribuir para o desenvolvimento sustentável dos territórios, pois atrai mais turistas e consumidores, com maior impacto nas produções da economia local, e contribui para o efeito de economias de escala nas produções desses territórios.

O eixo Cidadania, saúde e bem-estar junta seis artigos que, com recurso ao estudo de casos, advogam o diagnóstico precoce, quer de doenças crónicas quer de indícios de violação de direitos laborais ou outros. Na sociedade existem padrões estereotipados, os quais poderão conduzir a que os seus ícones com maior visibilidade se sintam marginalizados por não corresponderem ao que deles se espera, levando os mesmos a viver em mentira e enganos, quais mecanismos conscientes ou inconscientes de sobrevivência. Logo, aquela metodologia permitirá antecipar a implementação de mecanismos para o tratamento adequado e a prevenção da violência, evitando o escalar daquelas anomalias, contribuindo para uma saúde de qualidade e de bem-estar social.

O eixo Recursos energéticos e sustentabilidade ambiental reflete sobre um conjunto de sete artigos, os quais têm como preocupação central as mudanças climáticas e a eficiência energética. O sol é uma fonte de energia limpa e renovável que tende a substituir a energia gerada com recurso a extração de recursos não renováveis e geradores de emissões de gases de efeito de estufa. Em tese, aquela fonte permite que cada pessoa autogere o seu próprio consumo. Contudo, este hipotético cenário ainda está refém da eficiência da conversão conseguida pelos diferentes fabricantes de painéis fotovoltaicos. Por outro lado, é necessário proteger a identidade do território, valorizando as relações do indivíduo com o meio envolvente físico – paisagem natural – o que levou a que esta seja objeto de um tratados internacionais que a protegem. Esta proteção tem por finalidade estratégica conservar a biodiversidade, evitando o uso ou depósito de materiais não biodegradáveis.

Com a disponibilização deste livro e seus artigos, esperamos que os mesmos gerem inquietude intelectual, mais curiosidade científica e proatividade na procura de satisfação de novas necessidades e descobertas, motor de todas as fontes de inovação.

Jorge Rodrigues, ISCAL/IPL, Portugal  
Maria Amélia Marques, ESCE/IPS, Portugal

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# CAPÍTULO 1

## THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 2008 AND ITS SOCIAL IMPACT IN EUROPE

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**ABSTRACT:** In 2008, a financial crisis broke out in the United States of America and quickly spread to the rest of the world. Related to the subprime, this crisis was associated with real estate speculation, leveraged by the banking sector. At first, Europe thought that the “housing bubble” that burst in the USA, leading banks and investment companies to bankruptcy, was a strictly American problem, however, the exposure of European economies to international markets revealed the opposite and it soon became apparent that the European real estate and financial sectors were also on the verge of ruin, both inside and outside the eurozone, such as Greece or Iceland. Some countries in order not to go bankrupt had to ask for external financial support from the European Union, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund. The aid that these organizations provided called for a drastic austerity plan for the countries involved. In a scenario of crisis, austerity, unemployment and precariousness, Europeans took to the

streets to demonstrate all their dissatisfaction with the crisis but also with the politicians and policies they implemented to solve economic problems. Across Europe there have been huge protests, especially in countries that have received international aid. The social impact of the economic and financial crisis was particularly felt in countries such as Iceland, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. This article seeks to demonstrate how the economic crisis of 2008 awoke the citizenship of Europeans and changed their relationship with politics and government, exemplifying with the case of Greece and Iceland.

**KEYWORDS:** Citizenship. Contestation. Crisis. Europe.

### 1 INTRODUCTION

The 2008 economic and financial crisis is considered the biggest crisis since the Great Depression, in the 1930s, and one of the biggest crises of capitalism. The symbolic beginning of this crisis was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest North American investment bank, on September 15, 2008. A bank founded in 1850, which survived two world wars, the Great Depression, and others crises, did not resist this 2008 crisis and its fall marked a new era in the economy and financial markets. In fact, the crisis started

much earlier and was already evident since the summer of 2007. Financial deregulation, overvalued financial derivatives (supported by rating agencies), high risk mortgage loans (subprime) were some of the ingredients that triggered the crisis.

Effect of globalization, the crisis quickly hit the old European continent, showing the weaknesses of its banking system and the imbalance of its public finances, revealing the indebtedness of states, companies and families.

The crisis originated in the North American real estate market in 2007 and involved developed economies and developing economies, due to the effect of commercial and financial globalization and the importance of the United States of America in the global economy.

The emergence of this crisis, after the collapse of the American housing bubble, was due to the expansion of bank credit and the use of new financial instruments. However, it intensified due to the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers.

The panic reached the financial institutions, resulting in an increase in the preference for liquidity, destroying the process of selling assets on a large scale and causing the prices of these financial assets to drop and bank loans to be taken. This situation then caused a drop in international industrial and commercial production, reaching economies globally (Cechin & Montoya, 2017, p. 167). This crisis was, therefore, “a deep crisis of mistrust” (Bresser-Pereira, 2009, p. 133), of Europeans in relation to politicians, liberal and capitalist policies and even Democratic ideology.

This article seeks to demonstrate how the economic crisis of 2008 awoke the citizenship of Europeans and changed their relationship with politics and government, exemplifying with the case of Greece and Iceland.

## **2 THE BEGINNING OF THE ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL CRISIS**

In the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberal policies were implemented, beginning the path of financial deregulation, which caused the bursting of the speculative bubble related to shares of companies in the Internet business, leading to the loss of billions of dollars and the devaluation of these actions (Jardim, 2013, p. 13).

However, this deregulation has not been resolved, only transferred. Thus, in the early 2000s, transactions and lending in the real estate market intensified, with the North American mortgage market reaching its peak in 2003 (Cechin & Montoya, 2017, p. 156).

Low-cost loans have enabled low-income Americans to realize the dream of home ownership, while offering high-income and stable Americans another dream, that of high financial profitability, thus making their dreams compatible.

In this way, real estate financing contracts were made with high interest rates but with different percentages over time, that is, at the beginning of the contract, interest rates were low, being increased exponentially to compensate for the *ab initio* reduction, thus being proportional to the risk of operation. The payment guarantees for these contracts were often informal work and variable income, and thus, one day the guarantees disappeared and the installments of the home were no longer paid. This situation is called subprime, which is exactly high-risk credits granted to investors who do not have payment guarantees, the so-called NINJA loans (No Income, no Job or Asset).

The preservation of this expansionist real estate cycle lasted until the end of 2006 due to “the importance of the subprime, both in the issuance of new mortgages and in the securitization process” (Cechin & Montoya, 2017, p. 156).

Thus, at the beginning of 2007, all financial institutions decided to sell their high-risk securities that were worth almost nothing, so when asset prices went into acute deflation, the market entered a liquidity crisis.

These high-risk securities made up the assets of many of the US financial institutions and, if on the one hand, most of the assets are quoted on the market, on the other, their liabilities are recorded in contracts, unbalancing and making the capital of the insufficient financial institution itself to guarantee the continuity of its operations.

So, initially we were facing a “credit crisis, which turned into a liquidity crisis that, in turn, turned into an equity crisis” (Sicsú, 2009, pp. 144-145).

As the situation worsened, the US government decided not to support the fourth largest investment bank Lehman Brothers, which ended up declaring bankruptcy in September 2008, and the financial crisis acquired great proportions internationally, becoming a systemic crisis.

This systemic crisis therefore threatened “the international financial architecture”, explaining the limitations of the basic principles of the banking and financial regulation and supervision system in force and also of the survival of financial institutions (Farhi et al, 2009, p. 135).

According to Jennifer Hermann, this systemic crisis can be explained by the American monetary policy that failed in the interpretation and banking supervision, considered the element that propagated the crisis, and the excess of “spontaneous optimism”, which led to flagrant errors in risk assessment. Also, according to the same author, the crisis was caused by the liberal model of financial regulation “which was in charge of spreading its assets to the whole world” (Hermann, 2009, p. 140).

The crisis is banking and stemmed from the irresponsible granting of mortgage loans to creditors who were unable to pay or who would not have it from the moment

the interest rate started to rise, in addition to the use of “financial innovations” to securitize (financial practice of grouping types of assets for their trading on the market) rotten securities, transforming them into AAA securities by financial institutions and risk agencies. Thus, it is a crisis whose direct cause was the deregulation of the national financial systems, due to the neoliberal ideological wave legitimized by the neoclassical economic theory, dominant since 1970 in the United States of America (Bresser-Pereira, 2009, pp. 133-134).

This crisis is also a social crisis, caused by the increase in individual indebtedness and the consequent increase in eviction actions, the increase in bankruptcies of banks, financial institutions and companies and the resulting increase in unemployment. This situation resulted in enormous social discontent.

In this crisis, the “contagion effect” played an important role, since the globalization process allowed the economies to be exposed to external influences, that is, it made the instability of an economy easily spread to other economies (Cechin & Montoya, 2017, p. 152).

### 3 THE EXPANSION OF THE CRISIS TO EUROPE

The most globalized economic-financial integration has been in development since the 1980s, which made the expansion of this crisis considerably rapid.

The 2008 crisis, which started in the mortgage market, ended up reaching all types of markets and involving financial institutions and non-financial institutions, although it mainly affected the global financial system, conditioning investment, production and employment.

The world was attentive to the United States of America’s performance since the first signs of the crisis and, therefore, global economies retracted immediately after the fall of Lehman Brothers. This was the clear and obvious symbol of this crisis, representing its globalization.

With the spread of the crisis, the set of bankruptcies and interventions at a global level spread distrust in the national financial markets and in the companies themselves.

After the globalization of this crisis, the States acted in a coordinated way in an attempt to save the responsible financial institutions, through the injection of capital, redemption or purchase. However, the crisis was already installed in the United States of America and, thus, began its installation in several countries.

In this way, this crisis represented a “threat to the American hegemony”, while severely affecting the European economies and the Chinese economy (Jardim, 2013, p. 14). The 2008 crisis show the vulnerability of capitalism in the globalized world and the ineffectiveness of statesmen to resolve it (Silva, 2017, p. 104).



In European countries, some concern began to arise, considering that “the American credit risk was taking on large proportions”, having crossed the “Atlantic” not only through the market (...) but also through institutions, directly affecting the European financial sector (Cechin & Montoya, 2017, p. 161), a sector that presented marked volatility in its stock markets and an outstanding vulnerability in its financial conglomerates.

Therefore, this “moment of rupture in the functioning of a system” (Bobbio, 1998, p. 305), covered the whole of Europe, inside and outside the Eurozone. Since the Great Depression, there has been no such serious crisis in the capitalist system, especially financial capitalism on a global scale (Capinzaiki, 2015, p. 156). The exposure of the European financial system to the purchase of high-risk securities triggered chain banking problems after the fall of Lehman Brothers. And from a financial crisis, there was an economic crisis, and the huge public debts of countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal originated their rescue.

Foreign aid was accompanied by a “rhetoric about the moral responsibility of defaulters and the limits of indebtedness”, thus throwing the responsibility to the countries of southern Europe, to unsustainable public spending, to high wages, to the social benefits of workers and excessive consumption by families (Nunes, 2013, p. 11).

According to neo-Keynesian thinkers, unsustainable economic, financial and social policies were adopted in Europe, in which the main beneficiaries were “national and global elites”, the same ones who approved the speculation and economic-financial deregulation, privatization public functions and the almost absence of a common economic and social policy in the European Union (Nunes, 2013, pp. 11-12).

In social terms, this financial crisis brought austerity, unemployment and precariousness to Europeans, which provoked great popular discontent, as demonstrated by the wave of protest demonstrations that erupted in Europe between 2011 and 2013, especially in countries that received international aid (Silva, 2017, p. 104), case of Greece and Iceland.

In European countries, “the debt problems and austerity programs that are supposed to restore confidence have not only aborted any kind of recovery, but have produced renewed recessions and rampant unemployment” (Krugman, 2013, p. 16).

### 3.1 THE CRISIS IN THE EUROZONE: GREECE

The economic crisis began in Greece in late 2009/early 2010, when rating agencies (Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s) were alerted to the problematic growth of the country’s public deficit. Greece’s level of indebtedness had grown over the previous

decade, driven by increased public spending, civil servants' salaries, pension spending and tax evasion. Its deficit was already more than 3% prior to the crisis of 2008 (Grigoriadis, 2013); after that, the deficit increased considerably and fostered distrust in the markets in relation to public debt. This increased interest rates, thereby rendering the repayment of loans more onerous. The level of indebtedness was such that there was real fear Greece would fail to service its external debt. The Greek situation threatened to contaminate the entire eurozone. In order to minimise this threat, the Greek government adopted certain containment measures intended to control public spending and increase revenue. However, as the deficit did not decrease, the executive had to resort to requesting foreign aid in April 2010.

Greece joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981, at a time when the country was experiencing a period of economic growth after having freed itself from a military dictatorship. In 2001, Greece was accepted into the eurozone and, hence, it was considered safe for investments, which led to a growth in the GDP (gross domestic product), but also in national expenditure. After 2008, the financial situation became uncontrollable. External financial aid was provided by the European troika (International Monetary Fund [IMF], European Central Bank [ECB] and European Commission [EC]), but it was not without stipulations. Greece was required to adopt austerity measures. To comply with the rescue agreement, the Greek government announced a series of “draconian” measures, including tax increases, wage and pension reductions, privatisations, etc., the social impact of which was such that it brought the Greeks out onto the streets and squares of major cities to demonstrate and protest against austerity (Grigoriadis, 2013).

From 2010 to 2012, there was constant social upheaval, since the first rescue package proved insufficient and rendered a new rescue packet necessary, which was accompanied by more restrictions. The crisis was becoming uncontrollable and the protests in Syntagma Square and other squares across the country seemed permanent, with spontaneous movements of citizens who gathered in defence of democracy, as their ancestors had once met in the *agora* to exercise democracy, organising mass demonstrations. Between 2010 and 2013, these organised movements, which were led by the trade unions, resulted in nine general strikes that practically brought the industry, commerce, public administration and transport sectors to a stop, thereby aggravating the already weak Greek economy (Lima & Artiles, 2014).

Demonstrations took place in the largest squares and streets of Athens, as well as in major cities across Greece. Syntagma Square was the scene of the largest demonstrations, many of which ended in violence. Demonstrators, especially young men, threw rocks and bombs at the authorities, smashed windows and set fire to rubbish bins

and buildings. In an attempt to contain the situation, the police retaliated with tear gas and arrested some demonstrators (Jornal Sol, 06/15/2011). In 2012, the dispute increased due to Greece's need for a second bailout, as well as the fact that the parliament had to approve more austerity measures in order to receive it. The protests became even more violent, with clashes between protesters and police resulting in fires in several buildings in central Athens and some arrests (El País, 12/02/2012). In April 2012, the suicide of a retired pharmacist, 77, who killed himself in the middle of Syntagma Square, and who had left behind a handwritten letter expressing his desperation due to austerity measures, further escalated the protests (El Mundo, 04/04/2012).

Although the youths stood out due to their rebelliousness and irreverence, there were people of all ages involved in the protests, including unemployed adults who could not afford to support their families, pensioners whose pensions had been considerably reduced and youngsters who either had no job or else lived precariously.

In addition to the obvious economic problems, Greek citizens were disgusted by the lack of adequate response from their political institutions. Relatedly, Estanque (2014) considers the inefficacy of public policies to be the fundamental cause of the conflict seen in recent years.

### 3.2 THE CRISIS OUTSIDE THE EUROZONE: ICELAND

Iceland was the first country in Europe to be severely hit by the economic and financial crisis, triggering problems at the economic, financial, political and social level. However, Iceland was also one of the first countries to show signs of some recovery “just three years after the bankruptcy of its banking system” (Oliveira, 2015, p. 4).

The severe signs of the crisis in the country were triggered by the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, causing the fall of the three largest Icelandic banks, the freezing of the international payment system, the strong devaluation of the currency, the growth of inflation and, consequently, the loss of thousands of jobs.

The crisis that then hit Iceland showed the severe weaknesses and structural problems of its system, such as the very high trade deficit, the high level of household indebtedness and an oversized and poorly regulated banking system (Dufour, 2015, p. 7). In addition, the internationalization of Icelandic banking, with high-risk investments in the United States of America and Europe, made banks vulnerable to the crises in the countries where they invested (Oliveira, 2015, p. 10).

It is from 2002 that real estate growth begins to be noticed, caused by speculative housing prices, government aid and incentives for the purchase of home ownership and the ease of access to credit, through the Housing Financing Fund.

The housing boom has led to debt growth in the private, financial and domestic sectors at an unprecedented rate. However, the economy continued to grow, benefiting the banking system, which now has greater access to international markets.

Thus, Icelandic banks started to have a high exposure to the North American market, through the securitization of their banks assets in collateralized debt obligation, that is, the banks' main customers were also their main shareholders. This situation consisted of a coincidence between the interests of some shareholders and the interests of managers, "allowing risk taking and the reduction of liability to third creditors, resulting in a high concentration of risk" (Terlica, 2013, p. 130). Indirectly, "Icelandic banks were exposed to a global capital market risk, as they were financing highly leveraged domestic companies in assets of international companies" (Dufour, 2015, p. 16). Thus, in the event of a global collapse, insolvency would be possible.

In 2006, Iceland began to suffer from rising inflation and the devaluation of the currency - the Icelandic krona - causing an alarming lack of liquidity. Consequently, the applied monetary policy was quite restrictive as the official interest rate increased. However, it was not enough to "offset the increase in the provision of liquidity to the financial system, given the leverage of banks in foreign markets" (Terlica, 2013, p. 130).

As an alternative, deposit systems were created for customers outside the country, namely in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. The most relevant system was Icesave, as it offered very attractive interest rates.

Until 2007, consumption was always evolving, encouraged by tax cuts, easier access to credit, high asset prices and a favorable exchange rate, resulting in a high purchasing power for the population. This economic growth has led to a historic decrease in unemployment levels, an increase in wages, an appreciation of the currency and, consequently, an increase in the surplus.

However, this illusion of wealth in the population was the result of the increase in foreign currency inflows, which led to a strong appreciation of the Icelandic krone, encouraging investment. The assets of the Icelandic financial system were considered to be of good quality, but had longer maturities compared to liabilities and many of them were not liquid. As such, banks faced a risk of rushing deposits and, if that happened, there would be no chance of a bailout.

The Icelandic banking system was made up of few institutions, of considerable size and very closely linked, as it had three internationally relevant banks - Landsbanki, Glitnir and Kaupthing, but there was no entity capable of acting as a liquidity guaranteeing institution in the last instance. (Dufour, 2015, p. 22).

The summer of 2007 was marked, essentially, by the trigger of the international financial crisis and, with the fall in the prices of products directly related to the subprime mortgage market in the United States of America, the financial markets broke down. Immediately, Icelandic banks began to face serious difficulties and therefore they tried to reduce their activities to accumulate capital, but international markets demanded credit and foreign investors demanded the return on their investments, especially those applied in Icesave.

The banks thought that this situation could be resolved by taking more deposits and, therefore, increased the interest rates on retail deposits in order to attract more deposits. This measure, however, did not compensate for the movement of capital outflows and, in view of this situation, banks increased short-term financing through collateralized loans with central banks.

Contrary to what would be expected, Icelandic banks increased the number of loans granted and loans contracted with collateral in domestic bonds, further reinforcing liquidity problems. At the end of 2007, the lack of capital and liquidity led the banking sector to a critical situation (Terlica, 2013, p. 130). Then government decided to intervene, passing a law that allowed the government to borrow money to improve the Icelandic Central Bank's reserves. However, a few months later, the investment bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, further deteriorating the Icelandic market (Dufour, 2015, p. 26).

Within a single week, Iceland's three largest banks, which accounted for 85% of the financial system, went bankrupt. Trying to control the situation, the government separated bankrupt banks into new banks that should take responsibility for national deposits and loans, and into old banks that should keep assets in order to liquidate them. This measure was intended to maintain a payment and credit system in operation in the country (Dufour, 2015, p. 27).

The effort made to recover the banking and financial system corresponded to the devaluation of assets and the loss of billions in Icelandic kronor.

Thus, the liberal measures taken over the last decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century allowed the emergence of a financial bubble that burst in October 2008, when the three largest banks, with extensive international operations, collapsed and the financial sector has practically disappeared (Oliveira, 2015, p. 13).

The economic situation has thus changed dramatically. The deterioration of the Icelandic krone, the growth in the inflation rate and the increase in the external debt caused a decrease in the population's purchasing power and, consequently, a historical contraction in consumption. The unemployment rate has increased and wages have not kept pace with the rate of inflation, while working hours have decreased, causing

real disposable income to fall. As a result, financing facilities ended due to the collapse of banking, resulting in a cross-sectional fall in all branches of business, a decrease in disposable income and immigration levels, while emigration levels increased.

With the rapid deterioration of the Icelandic situation, on November 19, 2008, the International Monetary Fund approved a contingent credit agreement (or stand-by agreement) in the amount of US \$2.1 billion, with a duration of two years (from agreed value, \$827 million was made available immediately).

This agreement was necessary to recover the international confidence and to allow the rescue loan from Icesave. The agreement then provided for the following measures: preventing further currency devaluation through a contractionary monetary policy and greater control of capital; ensure long-term fiscal stability by creating new taxes, increasing existing taxes and reducing spending; and develop a plan for restructuring the banking and financial system through asset control measures, recovery strategies and regulatory practices.

At the end of 2008, the Icelandic government began negotiations with the governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which demanded the payment of investments by their citizens. Thus, through a vote in parliament, they decided that the country should bear the losses caused by the banks. Parliament decided to return 3.5 billion euros to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which meant that all Icelandic families would pay this payment for a period of 15 years. The people refused to pay the bill, and the Icelanders came to the streets of the capital Reykjavík to demonstrate against political and financial institutions. As the Icelandic crisis worsened, the protests took on large proportions and were supported by the majority of the population. Under social pressure, President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, refused the vote, requesting a referendum.

The demonstrations were called “The pots and pans Revolution”, seeking the resignation of the Haarde government, the scheduling of new elections and the revision of the Constitution. The sheer scale of these demonstrations made them historic in Iceland’s democratic history.

Initially, the demonstrations were constantly ignored but as the weeks went by and the protests intensified, the people made themselves heard. Done in front of Althing, they led to clashes with the police, who used tear gas and detained several protesters who defied government leaders and demanded a Real Democracy.

As the protests intensified, the government led by Haarde gave in, having resigned in January 2009. This resignation was followed by the resignation of the heads of the Central Bank of Iceland and the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority.

The elections were scheduled for April 25, 2009. On May 10, Jóhanna Siguroardóttir took office as Icelandic Prime Minister for the Social Democratic Alliance (Samfylkingin-Jafnaðarmannaflokkur Íslands), having held office until 2013. She was the first woman to hold office in Iceland.

In that same year, Iceland made an effective application for entry into the European Union, “based on the importance of joining the single currency as a means of stabilizing exchange rate volatility and reducing the impact of future financial and exchange rate crises in the country” (Terlica, 2013, p. 131).

In early 2010, President Ragnar Grímsson again refused to approve the parliamentary debt payment decision, holding a new referendum in March of the same year, which resulted in the vote against taking responsibility for the payment of debts that were incurred by banks.

This popular decision was reaffirmed in April 2011 after approval of the payment of debts with new conditions in parliament and after the Icelandic president refuses to ratify. The president referred: “The new conditions are better, but Icelanders will have to carry a debt that their banks have a duty to assume” and reforce “Iceland is a democracy, not a financial system” (Oliveira, 2015, p. 15).

In 2013, the Icelandic government took the decision to suspend negotiations for membership of the European Union. This decision was reaffirmed in 2015, reiterating the importance of close relations between Iceland and the European Union.

## 4 CONCLUSION

The factors that triggered the crisis in Greece were not the same as in Iceland, although in both countries it was the international situation that resulted from the fall of Lehman Brothers that originated the crisis. In terms of social impact, the consequences of the 2008 crisis were identical: debts, austerity, discontent.

In Greece, adherence to the single currency increased confidence in financial markets and led to further liberalization of the sector, resulting in a decrease in interest rates and an increase in private credit, although the lack of competitiveness in its economy and external indebtedness were structural weaknesses of the Greek economy. The 2008 crisis accentuated these weaknesses and showed others, leading the rating agencies to downgrade the Greek public debt rating, affecting their financing capacity. Unable to be able to finance itself directly on the financial markets, he had to seek external assistance from the EU and the IMF.

In Iceland, it was the problems arising from the privatization of banking and the consequent investment by Icelandic banking in the United States and Europe that led

to foreign indebtedness. The strategy adopted was to borrow on international capital markets and then lend to large Icelandic business groups, controlled by the owners of the banks themselves, which would invest in stakes in foreign companies.

In this way, the Icelandic banking system has grown too much, considering the size of the country itself, making the Icelandic Central Bank no longer able to guarantee the system, protect its assets and provide liquidity. The past situation in the country was “a dangerous combination of over-dimensioning, lack of regulation and supervision, over-indebtedness” that ended up contaminating other European economies, especially those that invested in Icesave (Machado, 2010, pp. 28-29). This combination was fundamental to the sequence of events that placed Iceland as the first victim of the strong crisis faced in 2008, which also suffered serious consequences from countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.

The financial crisis that hit the world showed the weaknesses of the Greek and Icelandic system, where there were structural problems such as a deficit in the trade balance, a high level of household debt and an oversized and poorly regulated banking system.

In both countries, the crisis caused a huge social impact, throwing citizens into unemployment, precariousness, and discontent with the policies and politicians that materialized in large demonstrations in the public space. This crisis raised awareness of citizenship, and they took to the streets to express their feelings about the crisis and the way politicians were facing it. The way in which citizens looked at representative democracy also changed, since many did not feel represented or safeguarded their interests, and began to demand a real democracy. The political response to social demands is that it was completely different. While in Greece there was an external intervention that demanded extreme austerity measures, supported by the citizens without having been consulted. In Iceland, initially, the government was following the same line of action as the European Union, but as the president refused to act without consulting the people through a referendum, the Icelanders resolved the crisis in their own way. Icelanders were the first to feel the crisis but they were also the first to resolve it, and the Greeks saw the crisis drag on and their sacrifices dragged on, and they were the last European country to come out of it.

The crisis of 2008 highlighted the vulnerability of capitalism in the globalised world, as well as the inability of statesmen to adequately tackle the problem. The exposure of European economies to the international markets globalised the crisis (Mason, 2016), revealing that the European real estate and financial sectors were also on the verge of ruin.



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